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IC 75-2842  
Committee 7

JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

6 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Background Documents for Individual Conference

REFERENCE: Memo for USIB Committee Chairmen,  
22 July 1975 (DCI/IC-75-2052),  
Unclassified

1. In response to referenced memo there are attached hereto:

- a. LOI to Chairman, JAEIC, for FY 75
- b. Annual Report on Progress of JAEIC,  
18 July 1975
- c. Draft LOI to Chairman, JAEIC, for FY 76

2. I am available for an individual conference at your convenience.

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[Redacted Signature]

Chairman

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[Redacted]

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USIB-D-32.7/2  
15 November 1974

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction

The Director of Central Intelligence has issued the attached Letter of Instruction to the Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. It is provided herewith to USIB for information.

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Executive Secretary

Attachment

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USIB-D-32.7/2

15 November 1974

15 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, USIB Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)

SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction

1. The purpose of this letter is to identify the problems which I expect the JAEIC to address and the tasks which JAEIC should accomplish in FY 1975 in support of my Intelligence Community responsibilities. In addition, you should be mindful of the "Guidance Applicable to all USIB Committee Chairmen" as set forth in my memorandum of 4 September on this subject.

2. The statement of duties as set forth in DCIDs 1/6 and 3/3 continue to apply, but specifically I instruct you to:

a. Develop in advance of an operational threshold test ban treaty the data and analytical techniques which will improve the accuracy of yield determination and which will provide a basis for assessing the validity of Soviet disclosures required by the treaty. I will expect a progress report on this task by 31 March.

b. Determine what additional intelligence assets would be required to provide higher degrees of confidence than now exist in the ability of "US national means" to detect significant Soviet violations of the TTBT and a PNET and associate costs and necessary lead times with each achievable level of confidence. Your report should be available to me by 30 April 1975.

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c. Assess the vulnerabilities of foreign nuclear industries to the theft or diversion of fissionable or radioactive materials by terrorist organizations or individuals. This could be either separate memoranda on individual countries or an overall study. Whichever course is followed, the assessment should be completed by 30 June 1975.

3. The continuing program of the JAEIC should also include the following:

a. Continue to monitor, and to report annually on, the extent of Soviet compliance with the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Critically review the capability of US intelligence resources to reflect potential Soviet violations of that treaty and recommend measures to maintain or to improve, within assigned resource levels, the ability to accomplish the monitoring task.

b. Encourage the development of departmental or national assets capable of rapid and positive identification of the movement of nuclear weapons into areas, such as the Middle East, where Soviet nuclear capable ground or air forces are not normally deployed. On this subject, provide me as soon as feasible a brief summation which assesses existing US capability to accomplish such identification and identifies plans and programs under way or projected to improve this capability.

c. Coordinate Community collection and evaluation activities to better anticipate when and where additional countries are likely to detonate nuclear explosives. Provide direction to the environmental sampling program as one contribution toward that objective.

d. Conduct periodic critical reviews of sensor research and development programs to determine compatibility with informational needs and to assure the cost effectiveness of those which are likely to become operational.

e. Conduct periodic critical reviews of operational technical intelligence collection systems directed primarily at AE targets to determine compatibility with information needs and to insure they are cost competitive and cost effective. Recommend means for improving their responsiveness to highest priority nuclear intelligence requirements.

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f. Assure that JAEIC is prepared to assist with the assessment of the degree and character of the risk associated with the introduction of nuclear materials or weapons into foreign countries by terrorist organizations.

  
W. E. Colby

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JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

18 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Annual Report on Progress of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

REFERENCE: D/DCI/IC Memo of 20 June 1975 to USIB Committee Chairman

1. During FY 1975 the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) focused on preparations for the effective monitoring of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and implementation of RIQ's 11 and 64. Routine responsibilities of the Committee (analysis and reporting of foreign tests and assessment of the impact of resource allocations on collection capabilities, for example) were fulfilled as well.

2. Concerning the tasks defined in the Letter of Instruction (LOI) to Chairman, JAEIC, of 15 November 1974, the following actions were taken:

a. A progress report, dated 25 March 1975, was transmitted to the DCI on the status of preparations for monitoring a TTBT and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). This report was in response to items 2a and b of the LOI. Efforts continue in the area of TTBT/PNET monitoring capabilities.

b. Little has been accomplished toward satisfying item 2c, which calls for an assessment of the vulnerabilities of foreign nuclear industries to theft or diversion of materials. This subject is currently bogged down by interagency sensitivities and in-fighting. Repeated overtures to the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) for

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SUBJECT: Annual Report on Progress of the Joint  
Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

data on the effectiveness of procedures for protecting US nuclear materials overseas, which is needed for the analysis of the effectiveness of foreign safeguards, have been frustrated by disagreements over the roles of ERDA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the limits which ERDA wishes to impose on intelligence community involvement with the subject. Efforts to resolve the impasse continue and in the future, with perhaps a more precise identification in the LOI of the intelligence role, I believe the problem can be solved.

c. Continuing activities of the Committee, responsive to item 3 of the LOI, have included:

(1) Preparation and publication of the 1974 "JAEIC Report on Activity to Monitor Safeguard (d) of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Sino-Soviet Activities" (USIB-D-32.10/21, 20 September 1974).

(2) Periodic summations by JAEIC of the successes and problems associated with the R&D, planning and operations of nuclear radiation sensors. The Committee has carefully explored all proposals, but has become convinced that in the near term the intelligence potential of the Navy's NUCINT operations and those in planning by DIA and CIA is limited.

(3) The expenditure of major portions of the Committee's efforts in assessing the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation, identifying the nations most likely to develop nuclear capabilities in the next five years and developing intelligence collection and analytical plans to insure


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SUBJECT: Annual Report on Progress of the Joint  
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timely knowledge of such developments. The effort was supported by the CAD sub-committee and the newly created Ad Hoc Nuclear Proliferation Working Group. An annual report on community performance under KIQ 64 was prepared for NIO/SP.



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3. The Committee also evaluated and produced US official statements on 26 foreign nuclear tests in FY-75.

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Chairman

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DRAFT

6 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, USIB Joint Atomic Energy  
Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction

1. This letter sets forth the major objectives which I wish the JAEIC to address in FY 76 in supporting me in fulfilling my intelligence community responsibilities. In addition, my memorandum of 4 September 1974 entitled "Guidance Applicable to All USIB Committee Chairmen" continues in effect.

2. Statements of responsibilities and procedures set forth in NSCID No. 3 (paragraph 7.d.), DCID 1/6 and DCID 3/3 are not affected by this memorandum, but I instruct you to undertake the following specific tasks:

a. Provide me in September 1975 and again in March 1976 with an assessment of the current and projected capabilities of intelligence resources, including the Atomic Energy Detection System, to satisfy the nuclear test detection, location and yield determination intelligence requirements arising from the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and a

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Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (if successfully negotiated and signed). In connection with these periodic reports, address recommendations concerning actions which I can take to resolve major deficiencies which adversely affect the ability of the intelligence community to inform policymakers of foreign nuclear tests which may be in violation of treaty commitments.

b. Continue the development of the data and analytical techniques which will provide the yield determination and other findings needed for treaty monitoring and which will provide a basis for assessing the validity of Soviet disclosures required by the TTB and PNET. Be prepared to report the results of this development to me shortly prior to the time the treaties are submitted to the Senate for ratification.

c. Assess the ability of selected foreign countries to protect their nuclear weapons and

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nuclear materials from theft or diversion. This assessment should be done in conjunction with ERDA, the DoD and other US agencies with parallel responsibilities for the security of US weapons and US nuclear materials in foreign countries. This study may be limited to those countries which are producing or storing their own plutonium or highly enriched uranium in kilogram quantities and in chemical forms more accessible to terrorist exploitation than, for example, irradiated fuel elements. I would like this assessment furnished to me no later than June 1976.

3. The continuing program of JAEIC in FY 76 should include the following:

a. On the subject of nuclear proliferation, coordinate community collection and analytical activities which are intended to respond to the relevant KIQ and provide an annual report to the NIO/SP on progress in

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fulfilling the KIQ and on the need for a new national estimate.

b. Maintain a continuing review of ongoing research and development into satellite sensors, radiation detectors and environmental sampling techniques to determine the compatibility of such programs with priority strategic intelligence needs and to insure that they are cost effective and that they complement the capabilities of other sensors and techniques.

c. Periodically review the performance of operational technical intelligence collection systems primarily intended to respond to nuclear intelligence requirements to insure that they are cost competitive and cost effective and that they are contributing to the highest priority nuclear intelligence requirements.

d. Conduct continuing assessments of the US capability to identify rapidly and

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positively the movement of Soviet nuclear weapons outside the Soviet Union. Provide to me by May 1976 a report on the status of the sensors, the operations, the analytical programs and the demonstrated and potential effectiveness of the reporting in support of US policy needs.

e. Continue to produce JAEIC assessments of the course and direction of the major foreign nuclear programs as needed, statements on foreign nuclear tests, current intelligence statements on foreign nuclear program activities or developments of an unusual or exceptional character, and such other finished intelligence products as are required.

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